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L and reform has emerged in recent
studies as a critical tool to generate “pro-
poor growth.” Land and wealth generation
are closely related. Ownership of land has
been shown to positively affect per capita
household income, ownership of durable
goods, and housing infrastructure. The
redistributive impact of land reform is thus
relevant in addressing the issue of persis-
tent poverty specifically in rural areas.
The land reform program in the Philippines
has been implemented since 1908. The
earlier programs, however, were instituted
primarily to break up friar lands. Starting in
the 1970s, the concept of land reform as a
poverty alleviation tool has been adopted.
Initially, coverage of the reform was limited
to rice and corn lands (Presidential Decree
No.72). A comprehensive land reform
program covering all agricultural lands was
later implemented in 1988 (RA 6657 known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program or CARP).
This Policy Notes addresses the redistributive
impact of land reform on rice and corn areas
in the Philippines. Although rice and corn
production in the country is typically charac-
terized by small farms, this has not been the
case in some areas, specifically in the inner
region of Central Luzon where haciendas orPN 2007-06
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ownership of family estates comprising
several hundreds of land have developed. In
particular, this region has been a priority
area under the 1972 land reform.
Scope of land distribution program
in the study villages
Two case study villages are presented in this
paper to depict two different farming
environments and landownership concentra-
tion. Village 1 is an irrigated area. Prior to
the 1972 land reform,  it is estimated that
more than one third of total agricultural
land in the village were owned by one
family. In contrast, Village 2 consists of
rainfed farms. Prior to the 1972 land reform,
there were several landowning families in
the village with no dominant family owner-
ship.
Land reform has been implemented in these
villages since 1972 but the land distribution
program was only completed (i.e., 100%
accomplishment based on targets) after the
institution of the CARP in 1988. This is
observed specifically in Village 1 where 55
percent of the total agricultural land was
redistributed under PD 27 while the
remaining under CARP (Table1). Compara-
tively, land distribution was implemented
more quickly in Village 2, with 77 percent of
the lands subject for land redistribution
completed prior to 1988.
Distribution of landholdings
of major landlords
As in other developing countries, landlords
tend to evade land reform. This has been
apparent in the recorded accomplishments
Table 1. DAR land distribution program by title type and by year in study villages
1972-1987 1988-1999 2000 up Total
Area (ha) % to Total Area (ha) % to Total Area (ha) % to Total Area (ha) % to Total
    Area     Area     Area     Area
NE 1 (Village 1)
EP 3.15 1.6 97.89 50.5 6.49 3.3 107.53 55.5
CLOA-I - - 44.08 22.7 4.43 2.3 48.51 25.0
CLOA-C - - 37.79 19.5 - - 37.79 19.5
Total 3.15 1.6 179.75 92.7 10.92 5.6 193.82 100.0
NE 2 (Village 2)
EP 18.18 11.1 98.85 60.5 3.71 2.3 120.75 73.9
CLOA-I - - 24.33 14.9 4.00 2.4 28.33 17.3
CLOA-C - - 14.42 8.8 - - 14.42 8.8
Total 18.18 11.1 137.61 84.2 7.71 4.7 163.50 100.0
Source: DAR Masterlist updated 2005
Notes:
EP – Emancipation Patent (PD 27)
CLOA-I – Certificate of Land Ownership Award, Individual (CARP)
CLOA-C – Certificate of Land Ownership Award, Collective (CARP)PN 2007-06
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of land distribution in the villages. Evasion
schemes are not necessarily illegal but are
mainly employed to the advantage of the
landlords. One evasion tactic that has been
observed in several areas is to increase the
retained area by registering excess holdings
in the names of sons, daughters, close
relatives, or even dummy relatives. Another
scheme is to mortgage land to defer land
reform. Land reform also excluded from the
coverage, lands under direct administration
of landlords (i.e., the landlord manages the
farm and employs hired labor). This provi-
sion has allowed landlords to expand the
areas under their direct supervision by
evicting tenants or paying off tenants
(Hayami et al. 1990).
In a 1985 survey of households in the same
study villages, about 20 to 30 percent of the
landless agricultural laborers residing in the
study villages were evicted tenants (Otsuka
1987). Land conversion to nonagriculture
use has also been another form of evasion.
Under CARP in particular, the provision of
“market-oriented” modes of land transfers
has provided additional opportunities for
evasion. It has been reported that most land
distribution that occurred under the volun-
tary land transfer (VLT) program are trans-
fers to children and relatives of landlords
(Borras 2002). VLT transactions are believed
to be “faked land transfers” since there is no
real transfer or redistribution that takes
place, yet the transfers are recorded as
accomplishments by DAR officials (Borras
2002).
The VLT scheme has also been popular in the
study villages. In Village 1, for instance,
about 78 percent of the total landholdings
subject to redistribution by the largest
landowning family in the village were
distributed to relatives via the VLT mode of
transfer (Table 2). This implies that less than
30 percent of the total land holdings for
land reform have been distributed to legiti-
mate farmer beneficiaries. VLT has also been
common in the study villages where the bulk
of land distributed during the CARP have
been completed through the VLT scheme
(Table 3). The popularity of the VLT in both
villages shows that in the later part of land
distribution, most transfers have been
facilitated by virtue of the landlords’ deci-
sion as to whom land should be transferred
and under what contractual arrangements
are favorable to them.
Redistributive impact of land reform
To be sure, land reform has succeeded in the
break up of large estates. There has been an
increase in the number of landowners
among farming households and the trans-
fers are apparently from among rich house-
holds (Table 4). In this sense, land reform
To be sure, land reform has succeeded in the break up
of large estates. There has been an increase in the
number of landowners among farming households and
the transfers are apparently from among rich
households... In this sense, land reform has had a pro-
poor impact in the rural sector.PN 2007-06
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Table 2. Distribution of estimated landholdings of prominent landlords in study villages
Land Reform Beneficiaries (ha)
Own Land Transfer to Relative % to Tenant % to Total   Mode of
 and Heirs  Relativesa Total Total Transfer to
     (ha)       (ha)  Relatives
NE 1 (Village 1)
OLO A 14.8613 16.2243 100.00 16.2243
OLO B 9.6307 22.2386 00.00 22.2386
OLO C 17.0391 9.0000 59.08 6.2337 40.92 15.2337 VLT
OLO D 27.2553 19.0017 2.4700 100.00 2.4700 OLT
OLO E 28.8192 24.7258 63.1540 77.98 17.8384 22.02 80.9924 VLT
NE 2 (Village 2)
OLO A 6.4375 9.9587 100.00 9.9587
OLO B 4.000 9.8169 4.0032 100.00 4.0032 OLT/VLT
OLO C 14.8347 9.2874 100.00 9.2874
OLO D 26.0834 3.5000 100.00 3.5000
OLO E 30.4883 100.00 30.4883
OLO F 13.638 35.5565 100.00 35.5565
OLO G 6.0200 40.0266 22.8710 100.00 22.8710 OLT/VLT
            
Source of basic data: Updated DAR Masterlist 2005; Administrative Order (AO) records and key informant interviews
a Relatives include up to the 3rd generation blood relation and dummies
Notes:
VLT – Voluntary Land Transfer
OLT – Operation Land Transfer
Table 3. DAR land distribution program
by mode of transfer in study villages
Area (ha) % to Total Area
   Distributed








      
Source: Municipal Agrarian Reform Office, City of Muñoz,
Nueva Ecija
Notes:
OLT – Operation Land Transfer
VOS – Voluntary Offer to Sell
VLT – Voluntary Land Transfer
has had a pro-poor impact in the rural
sector.
However, the extent of evasion in land
reform has adversely affected the redistribu-
tive reform that is envisioned by the pro-
gram. In both villages, land concentration,
as shown in the Herfindahl Index and
number of equally sized farms, has little
improvement from the land ownership
distribution prior to the implementation of
the 1972 land reform (Table 5). This is
because the bulk of redistributed land has
only been transferred to families and rela-
tives of the original landlords. Specifically,
land redistribution tends to be more diffi-




Table 4. Distribution of estimated land ownership (family + relatives*) by size
Prior to 1972 Land Reform Upon Completion of Land Distribution Program
Size      No. of %        Area %      No. of %        Area %
Landowners Covered (ha) Landowners Covered (ha)
NE 1 (Village 1)    
0 < 1.0 0 0.0 0.00 0.0 75 52.4 9.80 2.3
1.01 - 2.0 4 15.4 7.13 1.6 23 16.1 32.24 7.4
2.01 - 3.0 2 7.7 4.80 1.1 21 14.7 54.97 12.7
3.01 - 4.0 2 7.7 6.30 1.5 10 7.0 32.49 7.5
4.01 - 5.0 2 7.7 8.79 2.0 1 0.7 4.49 1.0
> 5.0 16 61.5 407.42 93.8 13 9.1 300.45 69.2
Total 26 100.0 434.44 100.0 143 100.0 434.44 100.0
Average    16.71     3.04  
NE 2 (Village 2)    
0 < 1.0 11 25.0 2.37 0.6 39 33.9 19.68 5.4
1.01 - 2.0 7 15.9 9.04 2.5 34 29.6 52.06 14.3
2.01 - 3.0 4 9.1 10.42 2.9 18 15.7 45.67 12.5
3.01 - 4.0 3 6.8 10.86 3.0 10 8.7 36.05 9.9
4.01 - 5.0 1 2.3 4.31 1.2 0 0.0 0.00 0.0
> 5.0 18 40.9 327.89 89.9 14 12.2 211.45 57.9
Total 44 100.0 364.89 100.0 115 100.0 364.91 100.0
Average    8.29       3.17  
*relatives – include up to the 3rd generation blood relation based
on key interviews
Policy implications
In many developing economies like the
Philippines, land remains closely related to
wealth. Land reform is thus necessary,
specifically in countries with historically
skewed land distribution. For land reform to
achieve a significant improvement in the
land inequality situation and sustain these
achievements, certain conditions, however,
have to be met.
First, an efficient land information system in
the country for land reform must be estab-
lished and quickly and comprehensively be
implemented.
Table 5. Land ownership concentration from estimated
landowning households in study villages
Prior to 1972 Upon Completion of Land
Land Reform     Distribution Program
NE 1 (Village 1)
Family + Relatives
Herfindahl index 0.140 0.105
No. of HH owners with
equally sized farmsa 71 0
No. of owners 26 143
Gini coefficientb   0.61   0.81
NE 2 (Village 2)
Family + Relatives
Herfindahl index 0.078 0.059
No. of HH owners with
equally sized farms 13 17
No. of owners 44 115
Gini coefficient   0.67   0.64
a reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index
b Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality
Note: Prior to land reform in NE 1, there was one dominant landowner while the rest are
medium-sized landowners. Upon implementation of land reform, the bulk of land owned by
the dominant landowner was distributed to the family/relatives as beneficiaries, resulting in
the existence of family estate with small-sized farms of ARBs.PN 2007-06
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Second, evasion and the possibilities of land
consolidation must be discouraged through
the adoption of a progressive taxation
scheme and efficient land information
system.
And third, farmers must be assisted and
given access to appropriate investment
opportunities so that these can lead to
better wealth generation. 
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